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Psychological research on people’s understanding of natural language connectives has
traditionally used truth table tasks, in which participants evaluate the truth or falsity of
a compound sentence given the truth or falsity of its components in the framework of
propositional logic. One perplexing result concerned the indicative conditional if A then
C which was often evaluated as true when A and C are true, false when A is true and
C is false but irrelevant“ (devoid of value) when A is false (whatever the value of C). This
was called the “psychological defective table of the conditional.” Here we show that far
from being anomalous the “defective” table pattern reveals a coherent semantics for
the basic connectives of natural language in a trivalent framework. This was done by
establishing participants’ truth tables for negation, conjunction, disjunction, conditional,
and biconditional, when they were presented with statements that could be certainly true,
certainly false, or neither. We review systems of three-valued tables from logic, linguistics,
foundations of quantum mechanics, philosophical logic, and artificial intelligence, to see
whether one of these systems adequately describes people’s interpretations of natural
language connectives. We find that de Finetti’s (1936/1995) three-valued system is the
best approximation to participants’ truth tables.
Keywords: natural language connectives, three-valued truth tables, uncertainty, de Finetti’s tri-event, subjective
probability
INTRODUCTION: THE BAYESIAN APPROACH TO THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING
From the beginning of their investigations, and for nearly a century, psychologists studying
human deductive reasoning considered bi-valued logic as the sole frame of reference. Their
early inspiration was limited to Aristotelian syllogistic (Binet, 1902; James, 1908) but in the
1950s Piaget adopted propositional logic which he assumed to be the basis of adults’ cognitive
functioning (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958). The elementary connectives of natural language for
negation, conjunction and disjunction were identified with the logical connectives ¬, ∧, and
∨, respectively, and the indicative conditional if A (antecedent), then C (consequent) was identified
with thematerial conditional (or implicationA ⊃C). However, in 1966,Wason observed that when
people are required to make judgments about conditionals in terms of true and false, they often
produce a table that differs from the material conditional. Participants consider that a conditional
if A then C is made “true” by the A and C state of affairs and made “false” by the A and not-C state,
but that the not-A cases (not-A and C and not-A and not-C) are “irrelevant” to the truth value of if
A then C. Psychologists came to call this truth table “defective” to underscore participants’ apparent
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imperfect comprehension of the material conditional which was
assumed to be the meaning of if . . . then. This “defective”
conditional is represented in Table 1 (column 1) as C|′′d′′A.
Wason’s (1966) observation was confirmed by early experimental
studies in which part of the participants required to choose or
construct the states of affairs that make the sentence true or false
disregard the not-A states (Evans, 1972) or choose the option
irrelevant when it is offered to them (Johnson-Laird and Tagart,
1969), or spontaneously express the irrelevance of these cases
(Delval and Riviére, 1975; Politzer, 1981). Whatever this table is
called, it should be contrasted with the truth table for the material
conditional which is true in the not-A cases (see Table 1, column
2). In addition, a “defective” biconditional (denoted by C||′′d′′A
in Table 1, column 3) has also been observed (Delval and Riviére,
1975). It is made true by the A and C state of affairs, and made
false by the A and not-C and not-A and C states, with the not-A
and not-C state alone “irrelevant” (see Evans and Over, 2004, for
further research on the “defective” conditional and biconditional
truth tables in psychology).
Until the end of the century, the major part of the theoretical
debate on deduction in cognitive psychology revolved around
the format of representation of the connectives. For one stream
of research the representation was assumed to be syntactic and
deduction rule-governed (Rips, 1994; Braine and O’Brien, 1998)
whereas for another stream it was assumed to be semantic
and deduction model-based (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991).
Whatever the option may be, the frame of reference was still two-
valued logic and the explanation of the defective table was amajor
item on the agenda. However, in recent years, this old model
of reference has been questioned and a new approach using a
probabilistic frame of reference has emerged. This new paradigm
in the psychology of reasoning emphasizes that most human
inferences take place when there is some degree of uncertainty
about the subject matter (Oaksford and Chater, 2007, 2009; Over,
2009, 2016; Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2010; Evans, 2012; Elqayam and
Over, 2013; Pfeifer, 2013; Baratgin et al., 2015; Baratgin and
Politzer, 2016; Over and Baratgin, 2017; Over and Cruz, 2018).
This uncertainty is found in both everyday thought and scientific
inference, when people are trying to decide what they will most
enjoy on a lunch menu, or to infer what has caused an outbreak
of food poisoning.
This new Bayesian approach to the psychology of reasoning
has received great impetus from two sets of experimental
findings. The first finding is that, as claimed by the theory, people
generally judge the probability of the indicative conditional,
P(if A then C), to be the conditional probability of C given A,
P(C|A) (for early data see: Evans et al., 2003, 2007; Oberauer
and Wilhelm, 2003, but see also Douven and Verbrugge,
2010; Vidal and Baratgin, 2017). The second finding is that
participants’ assessments of the conclusions of explicit deductive
inferences made under uncertainty tend to be in the coherence
intervals determined by the probability of the premises, that is,
participants tend to conform to the laws of probability (Pfeifer
and Kleiter, 2009, 2010, 2011; Pfeifer, 2014; Singmann et al., 2014;
Cruz et al., 2015; Evans et al., 2015; Politzer and Baratgin, 2016).
An important target of the new Bayesian paradigm concerns
the “defective” table mentioned earlier. Supporters of the
new paradigm consider that far from being anomalous it
reveals a semantics that differs from the material conditional
(Baratgin et al., 2013, 2014)1. This point will be developed
below and generalized to the basic connectives of natural
language (negation, conjunction, disjunction) and also to the
biconditional.
THE DE FINETTIAN APPROACH
Is there a normative framework for unifying all these
experimental results? We have argued (Baratgin, 2015; Baratgin
and Politzer, 2016; Over and Baratgin, 2017; Over and Cruz,
2018) that de Finetti’s Bayesian subjective theory offers just such
a framework. De Finetti is one of the founding fathers of modern
probability theory, and the most prominent representative of
subjective Bayesianism. His overall approach to probability (de
Finetti, 1974) has deep psychological relevance (see Baratgin and
Politzer, 2006, 2007; Baratgin, 2015, for a discussion in the field
of the psychology of probability judgment). His conception of
probability as subjective degree of belief, and of the assessment
of probability through the well-known betting procedure, are
rooted in psychological reflection.
de Finetti (1980) proposed three levels of knowledge of an
event. The objective level, Level 0, corresponds to binary logic,
in which every statement that expresses the occurrence or the
non-occurrence of an event is objectively true or false. This is the
level of events that are known for sure. It is this level that was
traditionally studied in the psychology literature of reasoning,
even though it is severely limited for a psychological approach,
for people often do not know for sure what is true and what is
false. It is also, ironically, the level of which de Finetti (2006, p.
113) says that it is “sterile” because logic has no other use than
order, enumerate, and expound what is already known. A purely
logical science cannot be concerned in forecasting. Hence the
need to substitute this “rigid logic” with a ”logic of the probable“
that is the logic of everyday allowing to make predictions with
regard to uncertain knowledge (de Finetti, 1977/1993, p. 494).
Beyond Level 0, de Finetti (1980) considered two other levels
that are subjective. On Level 1, the event (or statement) concerns
a specific object defined by its own characteristics known to the
individual. An event is always conditioned on the individual’s
personal state of knowledge. The statements can be classified as
having one of three values: true, characterizing an expected event
that has happened; false, characterizing an expected event that
has not happened; and uncertain. The value uncertain is to be
understood as follows. It represents the subjective point of view
of an individual who is wondering whether or not an event will
happen or, equivalently, whether the statement that expresses the
occurrence of the event is true or false. The third value reflects a
1Several philosophers have proposed an identical 2 × 2 “defective” table in their
analysis of “if ” in ordinary language, with different interpretations of the third
value. According to Quine (1950) a conditional affirmation with a false antecedent
is as if it had never been made. O’Connor (1951) defines a table with a third
undetermined value. Dummet (1958/1959) presents a similar table where the third
value corresponds to neither true nor false. Kneale and Kneale (1962, p. 135–136)
suggest a “defective” table (in the sense of defective truth function) where the value
I (denoted by ”–“) characterizes a truth-value gap.
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TABLE 1 | The different truth tables for the conditional if A then C: two-valued (columns 1–3′) and three-valued (columns 4–7).
1 1′ 2 3 3′ 4 5 6 7
A C C|′′d′′A C|FiA A ⊃ C C||′′d′′A C||FiA A C C|?A C|FiA C|FaA C|CA
T T T T T T T T T T T T T
T ∅ ? ∅ ∅ ∅
T F F F F F F T F F F F F
∅ T ? ∅ ∅ T
∅ ∅ ? ∅ ∅ ∅
∅ F ? ∅ F F
F T I ∅ T F F F T ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
F ∅ ? ∅ ∅ ∅
F F I ∅ T I ∅ F F ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
T, true; F, false; I, Irrelevant; ∅, third value; ?, T or F or ∅;
1.
(
C|′′d′′A
)
, the 2 × 2 “defective” conditional table;
1′. (C|FiA), the 2 × 2 Finettian interpretation of 1;
2.(A ⊃ C), the 2 × 2 material conditional;
3.
(
C||′′d′′A
)
, the 2 × 2 “defective” biconditional table;
3′. (C||FiA), the 2 × 2 Finettian interpretation of 3;
4.
(
C|?A
)
, the 3 × 3 general (underspecified) conditional;
5.
(
C|Fi
)
, the 3 × 3 de Finetti conditional table;
6.
(
C|FaA
)
, the 3 × 3 Farrell conditional table;
7.
(
C|CA
)
, the 3 × 3 Cooper conditional table.
transitory state of ignorance (at a given time) until the statement
is verified or falsified. Until this takes place, it is impossible to give
it a truth value. Even though he did not vary in this conception of
the third value, he used various terms to designate it; his favorite
expression was “void” (e. g., de Finetti, 1967, 1974, 1995/2008)
which we will adopt and will denote by “∅”.
To formalize these notions, de Finetti (1936/1995, 1967, 1974,
1995/2008, 2006) defined a three-valued system that uses the
third value void and is superimposed on a two-valued logic that
uses true and false. We describe below the three-valued truth
tables that define this system, specifying how these values are
propagated for the usual connectives.
The second epistemic level in de Finetti (1980), Level 2, is
a development of the first level. At this level, the initially non-
numerical degrees of belief are finally expressed as numerical
probability judgments. People are seldom fully ignorant about
an event. They have expectations, make subjective probability
judgments, engage in wagers, etc. This level corresponds to the
full range of subjective degrees of belief about events where the
initial ignorance and the ensuing uncertainty give way to the
expression of additive probabilities. Fine distinctions are thus
possible at Level 2, which is of psychological importance, since
both ordinary people and scientists do often distinguish between
events that are uncertain, judging some as more probable
than others conditionally on their personal state of knowledge
(Baratgin, 2015).
A substantial amount of research on uncertain reasoning has
been carried out at Level 2—in fact most of the work mentioned
above on the probability of conditionals or deduction under
uncertainty. Hardly any research has been done to investigate
Level 1 (with the exception of Baratgin et al., 2013, considered
below). Level 1 should support and lead up to Level 2, and yet
most contemporary theorists in the de Finetti tradition have
concerned themselves with a much more refined and expressive
system at Level 2 in which the third value for if A then C is
specified by the conditional probability itself, P(C|A), and the
logical values true and false are replaced with 1 and 0 (Gilio,
1990; Jeffrey, 1991; Coletti and Scozzafava, 2002; Pfeifer and
Kleiter, 2009). As Baratgin et al. (2013) point out, Level 2 removes
some anomalies in Level 1, for people are never ignorant of
trivial tautologies, such as if A & C then A and A or not-A
(Over and Baratgin, 2017). But people do not always, and could
not always, make such fine-grained evaluations of Level 2. They
can, however, simply express their ignorance, or in other words,
can remain at the transitory level 1. In summary, there is a
gap to fill. De Finetti’s theory has gained much experimental
support at Level 2, but the question of its descriptive adequacy
at Level 1 is open. The present paper addresses this question
in several experiments, our aim being to test the descriptive
adequacy, for ordinary people’s judgments, of de Finetti’s Level
1 in his overall theory of subjective probability. For half a century
research in the psychology of reasoning has produced robust
results on the comprehension of the connectives of propositional
logic. People’s performance indicates that they possess negation
and conjunction, and to a lesser extent, disjunction (Manktelow,
2012) but their comprehension of the material conditional
and biconditional is “defective,” in the sense mentioned above.
However, these studies were limited to the framework of classical
bi-valued logic. The change of conceptual framework brought
about by the Finettian theory necessitates that these studies be
carried out with a tri-valued logic. The present study applies itself
to refine and reinterpret the old results.
We now turn to the analysis of de Finetti’s three-valued system
in some detail. We begin with focusing on the conditional, which
leads us to the concept of conditional event (or tri-event). A
conditional event is defined by de Finetti (1936/1995) as a logical
entity that is true when the antecedent A and the consequent C
are true; false when A is true and C false; and void in the sense
introduced above when A is false. The conditional event is closely
analogous to a conditional bet, which is won in the first case, lost
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in the second case, and called off in the third case, when it is
“void” and no one wins or loses (see Politzer et al., 2010, on this
analogy and the relation to Ramsey, 1926/1990, 1929/1990). So, at
Level 1, the betting interpretation helps illustrate the void case2.
It now appears that the empirical “defective” table for the
conditional should be called the “2 × 2 de Finetti table”
(and similarly for the “defective” biconditional) to avoid the
negative term “defective” (Milne, 2012; Baratgin et al., 2013,
2014; Nakamura and Kawaguchi, 2016). Notice (Table 1) that in
columns 1 and 3 the empirical “defective” table bears a symbol
”I“ (for irrelevant), whereas in column 1′ and 3′ the 2 × 2 de
Finetti tables bear the symbol “∅” (for void). This point deserves
explication. The 2 × 2 “defective” table in column 1 (Table 1)
describes the psychological observation that participants judge
that the states of affairs in which the antecedent is false do
not allow to evaluate the conditional sentence in terms of true
or false. Participants say that the sentence is neither true nor
false, or that it may be true or false, or that one cannot know,
and the term “irrelevant” (readily endorsed by participants) was
coined by psychologists to express participants’ perplexity about
the truth value of the sentence. In other words, “irrelevant” and
“void” refer to the same state of ignorance, the former being
empirically-based and descriptive, and the latter theoretical.
The next step is to take into account the ignorance that
can affect elementary events, considering that they, too, can
be true, false or void (because for de Finetti all events are
conditional), leading to a three-valued (3 × 3) truth table for
the conditional event (denoted by C|FiA in Table 1, column 5)
which de Finetti (1936/1995) called ”subordination“. Similarly,
he defined three-valued truth tables for the ordinary connectives
(negation, conjunction, disjunction, see below). This set of truth
tables which we will call “3 × 3 de Finetti tables” constitutes de
Finetti’s Level 1 system, abbreviated to Fi.
Traditional psychological experiments on the “defective” table
were limited by the fact that the antecedent A and consequent C
of the conditional did not have the third value, but de Finetti’s 3
× 3 table, while encompassing the 2 × 2 de Finetti table, allows
A and C to have the third value. In brief, we can find in the 3× 3
de Finetti tables an answer to the question of what value does if A
then C have when A or C have the third value (even though this
was not his main objective). Of course, because the 3 × 3 table
incorporates the 2 × 2 table, it keeps answering the question of
what value does if A then C have when A is false: it is void. Note
that void defined by a state of ignorance (as well as irrelevant
expressed by participants in psychological experiments) is not
a truth value homogeneous with true and false; rather, it is a
meta-evaluation (for an analysis of this point, see Dubois and
Prade, 2001; Dubois, 2008). It is in this sense that the 3 × 3 logic
is superimposed on the 2× 2 logic.
The conditional is so important that Baratgin et al. (2013)
initially focused on it in their experimental study of three-valued
2There is much more in the betting scheme: de Finetti (1937/1964) proposed it at
Level 2 as a procedure to operationally evaluate P(C|A), from which it follows that
the conditional event can be represented as a three-valued random quantity taking
on values 1, 0, P(C|A) (Gilio, 1990). Note that de Finetti (1962, 1964/1972, 1974)
proposed also the penalty criterion (based on the Brier score) as a procedure to
operationally evaluate P(C|A) (see for a recent analysis Gilio and Sanfilippo, 2011).
tables. They observed that almost 60% of participants who gave
responses in agreement with de Finetti’s 2 × 2 table expanded it
to produce de Finetti’s full 3 × 3 conditional event table, when
evaluating indicative conditionals and conditional bets. This is
the first result supporting de Finetti’s Level 1 system, but it is
limited. Extending it to the other connectives of the systemwould
demonstrate its descriptive adequacy, that is, provide a semantic
theory of the interpretation of natural language connectives under
uncertainty. This is the objective of the present paper. But before
proceeding to the experiments, we should make some theoretical
andmethodological points. There exist many three-valued logical
systems (for reviews, see Rescher, 1969; Haack, 1974; Gottwald,
2015). Some of them appeared before de Finetti, and many more
have appeared in cognitive science since then. Psychologists of
reasoning have so far done little to study whether any of these
tables matches the judgments of ordinary people when they are
in a state of ignorance about what is true and what is false (but
see Elqayam, 2006, on “liar” paradoxes)3. Some of these systems
propose a conditional table encompassing the 2 × 2 de Finetti
table and so constitute possible alternative theories to de Finetti’s
Level 1 system, Fi. We give a short overview of these systems
in the next section. See Appendix A (Supplementary Material)
for amore detailed description, andAppendix B (Supplementary
Material) for a presentation of the authors’ individual reasons for
developing their systems.
NINE SYSTEMS OF THREE-VALUED
TABLES
An Extension of 2 × 2 Bi-valued Tables
In addition to de Finetti’s (1936/1995) 3 × 3 table for the
conditional event, there exist numerous other possibilities to
build a 3 × 3 table to represent the indicative conditional of
natural language, which we will call the natural conditional.
Consider column 4 in Table 1 in which C|?A represents a general
3× 3 conditional table for this natural conditional. Here A and C
can be true (“T”), false (“F”), or judged to be neither. After lines
1, 3, 7, and 9 have been filled in with the values of the “defective”
table, there remain five cells marked with “?.” The basic question
is: what value should be in the place of each “?” to represent
the natural conditional? There are 243 possible ways (35), in
theory, of completing this conditional table. The same question is
also posed for the other connectives. Among the existing three-
valued logics we have found only nine three-valued systems that
extend the 2× 2 de Finetti table for the conditional and that also
propose 3 × 3 tables that extend standard two-valued logic for
the conjunction and disjunction connectives. By “extending,” we
mean 3× 3 tables that have the same true or false values as their 2
× 2 counterpart in lines 1, 3, 7, and 9 mentioned above. Looking
for such extensions is motivated by the experimental evidence
that the classical 2 × 2 conjunction and disjunction truth tables
are produced by a majority of people (Manktelow, 2012).
3Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2008) used Kleene’s (1938) three-valued logic in
the framework of logic programming, but they did not study participants’ truth
tables.
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These nine systems of three-valued tables originate from
the work of logicians, linguists, philosophers, and artificial
intelligence researchers, who had different theoretical interests
and approaches. As we will see in section Interpreting the
Connectives and Appendix B (Supplementary Material), this is
most evident in their interpretation of the third value. Some
of these systems were not originally intended to represent an
intuitive sense of uncertainty, which de Finetti aimed to capture
(Baratgin and Politzer, 2016), but even so, they do have some
prima facie interest for psychological modeling, simply because
they extend the traditional 2 × 2 tables of two-valued logic to
three-valued systems. Three-valued judgments have long been
found in truth table studies of the conditional in psychological
research, as we have described.
In summary, there are four basic connectives (negation,
conditional, conjunction, disjunction). Three types of
conditional (see Table 1, columns 5, 6, and 7) and four types
of conjunction and disjunction (see Appendix A, Table A.2
in Supplementary Material) constitute the differential building
blocks of the nine three-valued systems: as displayed in
Appendix A, Table A.3 (Supplementary Material), each system
is defined by using the involutive negation and by selecting one
type of connective among the other three basic connectives4. A
short reminder on the origins of three-valued logic is given in
Appendix B (Supplementary material), followed by the origins
of the nine “extended” systems [numbered (1)–(9)].
Interpreting the Connectives
The different truth tables for the connectives in Table 1 and
Tables A.1, A.2, A.5 (Supplementary Material) may appear
somewhat formal, and so we give a brief informal overview of
how they differ from each other. We begin with the conditional if
A, then C.
Recall that six systems, (1)–(6) in Appendix B
(Supplementary Material), adopt the Fi conditional and so
share the notion that a conditional with a false antecedent takes
on the value∅. Indeed, we have already seen through the betting
schema that, whenever the antecedent A is not known to be true
(∅ or F), the Fi conditional takes on the value ∅. In addition, a
conditional sentence whose antecedent is true takes on the truth
value of its consequent.
What distinguishes the Fi conditional from the other two
conditionals, in columns 6 and 7 of Table 1, appears precisely for
the value ∅ of the antecedent in lines 4 and 6. Two of the nine
systems, (8) and (9) in Appendix B (Supplementary Material),
use the Cooper conditional. For this conditional, with a truth-
value gap∅ (denoted by G for gap by Cooper) for the antecedent,
the conditional takes on the value of the consequent, which is
also the case when the antecedent is T. This captures the notion
that the conditional has the same value with a ∅ antecedent as
it has with a T antecedent. Only when the antecedent is F is the
conditional ∅ whatever the value of the consequent. The Farrell
4With the exception of the R system, the material conditional and the
material biconditional are not defining features because they can be derived
compositionally from the basic connectives using the formulasA ⊃ C =df ¬A∨C,
and A⇐⇒ C =df (A ⊃ C) ∧ (C ⊃ A).
conditional, (7) inAppendix B (Supplementary Material), differs
in that it adopts a slightly more cautious evaluation: When the
antecedent has a truth-value gap ∅ (denoted by I for ignorance
by Farrell) and the consequent is T the conditional is not T but
∅ (Table 1, column 6). Note that both concur in holding the
conditional to be F when the antecedent is∅ and the consequent
F. How this differs with Fi can be exemplified as follows. Suppose
it is unknown whether this chip is square, while it is false that this
chip is black. Then to evaluate if this chip is square, then it is black,
some theorists (like Farrell and Cooper) may have the intuition
that it is “false,” whereas others (like de Finetti) may have the
intuition that the value is “void”5.
We can further examine the differences between systems by
comparing the four types of conjunction and disjunction on
which they are based that we have identified, viz., KLH, B,
S, and M [defined in Appendix A (Supplementary Material)].
Most proposed systems (like Fi) in Appendix B (Supplementary
Material) have truth-value gaps and consequently differ from
three-valued systems proper in which the third value is
homogeneous with the values T and F to which it can be
compared using a relation of order. Most authors define an
order between the truth-value gap and T and F. In de Finetti’s
framework, the truth-value gap is viewed as intermediate between
F and T. Mura (in de Finetti, 1995/2008) gives a pragmatic
justification with the bet schema: the payoff of a void bet is
clearly intermediate between the payoff of a bet that is lost and
a bet that is won (for more technical justification, see Hailperin,
1996; Milne, 1997, 2004; Blamey, 2001; Mura, 2016). It is exactly
the order of KLH connectives. Conjunction obeys the following
principle: the three values are formally put in an order denoted
by F ≤ ∅ ≤ T (Dubois and Prade, 1994); then, whenever
two sentences are connected, the value of the conjunction is
the minimum of their values, that is, the conjunction gets the
“weaker” value. Consider a context of chips of different shapes
and colors. With the interpretation of ∅ as a truth-value gap
resulting from ignorance, take a true sentence, for instance the
chip is square (T), and suppose one is ignorant whether the chip
is black (∅); then the conjunction the chip is square and it is
black is evaluated as∅ because min(T,∅)=∅. Suppose now the
chip is square to be false; then the conjunction the chip is square
and it is black is evaluated as F because min(F, ∅) = F. Similar
considerations obtain for disjunction,mutatis mutandis.Here the
value of the connection is defined by the maximum values of the
disjuncts. If it is known to be true that the chip is square (T)
and one is ignorant whether the chip is black (∅), then the chip
is square or it is black will be evaluated as true because max(T,
∅)= T.
The various conjunctions obey the min order but they
have their own formal order for the three values, which in
5One may balk at this notion because conditionals typically have uncertain
antecedents and nevertheless they often convey a high degree of belief (or disbelief)
rather than ignorance. One need not know whether it is true that this man will fall
from the 20th floor to hold it to be false that if this man falls from the 20th floor he
will survive. In this apparent counter example, which is on Level 2, the common
knowledge suggests a degree of belief. In contrast, with our abstract and arbitrary
material on Level 1 individuals have no expectations about the truth value of the
conditional.
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fact differentiates them from each other. The same obtains
for the disjunctions with the max order. We will not review
them in detail, but will have a look at what the choice of an
order intuitively means. Take Bochvar’s (1938/1981) conjunction
∧B. Its order is ∅< F < T. This means that whenever a
sentence with the third value is connected (conjunctively) with
another sentence whatever its value, the third value prevails and
“contaminates” the conjunction. Similarly for disjunction ∨S, the
order corresponds to F < T< ∅. For instance, with a third value
interpreted as of no interest, the sentence the chip is square being
true or false and the chip is black being of no interest, the sentence
the chip is square or it is black will be evaluated as being of no
interest in each case. The situation is opposite for the Sobocinsky
connectives where the orders are F < T< ∅ for conjunction and
∅ < F < T for disjunction, resulting in connections that appear
to be “immune” to the third value as the other values absorb it.
With the previous example, the disjunction will be evaluated as T
in the first case and F in the second one.
Finally, consider involutive negation, which all the systems
share. T is negated by F and F by T like in two-valued logic.
Negating the third truth value by itself captures the intuition that
one cannot consider a sentence that is not ∅ as T any more than
consider it as F, so that it remains∅.
Prima facie all the nine systems, irrespective of their
origins and motivations, provide candidates for three-valued
tables relevant to the psychological modeling of people’s
comprehension of connectives under uncertainty. They
accommodate and extend the 2 × 2 de Finetti table for the
conditional, which is supported by earlier psychological research,
as we have explained. Most of the systems above are directly
relevant to psychologists, especially those motivated by linguistic
considerations and the inappropriateness of the material
conditional to represent people’s interpretation of the natural
language conditional (such as BFM, etc., defined in Appendix A
(Supplementary Material). Clearly, an empirical investigation
is necessary to decide which of these three-valued systems
best fits ordinary people’s judgments about natural language
connectives. We present several experiments that aim to answer
this question by examining people’s truth tables for negation,
conjunction, disjunction, the conditional, and the biconditional.
More strongly, we ask whether the tables closest to people’s
judgments belong to one system in the literature. For all the
reasons detailed in section The de Finettian Approach, and in
view of the results we have already obtained for the conditional,
we consider de Finetti’s Level 1 system as the most serious
contender. Recall that it is characterized by the Fi conditional
and the KLH conjunction and disjunction.
EXPERIMENTS: THE FINETTIAN AND
OTHER THREE-VALUED SYSTEMS
Method
Participants
In Experiment 1 (N = 54) and Experiment 2 (N = 101),
participants were French native speakers. They were students
at the University Paris 8 who volunteered for the experiments.
They already held a degree and were resuming their studies in
a remote teaching program in the social sciences. They had no
specific background in logic or probability theory. In Experiment
3, participants were 58 undergraduate Japanese native speaker
students enrolled in a computer programming class at the
Tokyo Denki University. All were naive to the purposes of the
study. Experiments 1 and 2 were administered on a computer
screen and Experiment 3 was presented in a booklet. An online
informed consent was obtained from all participants. This
study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations
of the APA ethical principles and code of conduct and was
approved by the ethics committee of Laboratoire Cognitions
Humaine et Artificielle (EA 4004–CHArt), Université Paris 8,
France.
Materials
In Experiment 1 and 2 the same material was used. Participants
were presented with sentences that referred to a chip that could
be in one of two colors, black or white, and one of two shapes,
square or round. The task was to judge whether the sentences
were true, false, or neither. There were different conditions
of visibility. In one condition, the chip was seen through a
transparent window, making it clearly true whether the chip was
square, or round, and similarly making it clearly true whether the
chip was black or white. In another condition of visibility, the
chip was seen through a device that made it visually impossible
to know whether the chip was square or round. And in a third
condition of visibility, the chip was seen through a filter making
it visually impossible to know whether the chip was black or
white. And finally the chip could be seen through both the device
and the filter, making both the shape and the color impossible
to identify. This technique allowed us to fill up the nine cells
of a three-valued truth table with the participants’ responses
(see Figure 1).
In the third experiment (Japanese participants), an
isomorphic material with pictures of round or pointed chips that
could be blue or red was used (Figure 2).
Design and Procedure
In the three experiments, participants were required to judge
the truth value of the sentence under consideration for the nine
combinations corresponding to the nine cells of the truth table
(see Figure 3).
For the three experiments the combinations were presented in
a random order and each one was accompanied by three response
options: certainly true, certainly false, neither true nor false. The
participants were required to select one option (see an example
in Figure 4 for the conjunction).
The choice of the adverb “certainly” reflects the Finettian
notion that when an event is known to have occurred or not
to have occurred, this is known with certainty, and so the truth
or falsity of the proposition that expresses it is certain. Besides,
this should avoid possible common fuzzy interpretations of “true”
and “false” such as “very likely to be true/false.” This wording has
already been used for the same purpose in the context of research
on the framing effect (Mandel, 2014).
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FIGURE 1 | The presentation of the game in Experiments 1 and 2.
FIGURE 2 | The presentation of the game in Experiment 3.
The choice of the wording neither true nor false for the third
option was made for several reasons. First it should be as close as
possible to de Finetti’s conception and formulation of the third
value. This third value (or void, as de Finetti often called it) is the
evaluationmade by an individual who is not in a position to know
whether an event is true or false. Commenting on the tri-event,
de Finetti explicitly states that the third value is to be regarded as
neither true nor false: ”Whenever the condition B is satisfied, then
A|B is either true or false (1 or 0). But unless the condition B is
satisfied, one can neither say that the event A|B is true, nor that
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FIGURE 3 | The nine possible combinations of photographs (Experiments 1 and 2) or pictures (Experiment 3) corresponding to the nine cells of the three-valued truth
table.
the eventA|B is false. It is void or null in the sense that the premise
under which it is considered either true or false no longer holds.
In my opinion, these three cases should be treated as distinct“ (de
Finetti, 1995/2008, p. 170).
Second, it should capture participants’ natural evaluations,
that is, with as little suggestion as possible. In principle, the third
option could be “true or false” (or some equivalent expression
such as “It could be true or it could be false.” This option is correct
(and trivial) from a logician’s objective point of view. But it does
not readily accommodate subjective judgments, in particular
those generated by three-valued systems (see the various and
subtly different interpretations of the third value in section
Interpreting the Connectives). By parity of argument, it might
be objected that “neither true nor false” cannot accommodate
the choice of “true or false” because it is incompatible with
it. This is correct, but pragmatically rejecting the assertions
that the sentence is true and that it is false gives rise to the
assertion that it is neither. More precisely, participants who do
not find an assertable option are led to interpret the third option
as a means to express just this (and to disregard the logical
triviality in case it had come to their mind). The judgment
that neither “true” nor “false” are adequate options induces the
judgment that “neither true nor false” is adequate, which turns
the third option into a meta-option equivalent to “other” that
cannot be put on the same level as “true,” “false,” and “true or
false.”
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FIGURE 4 | Example of a trial (one logical combination) for conjunction. The first conjunct has the third value ∅ and the second conjunct is false.
Third, the format should be common to all the connectives.
For the conditional in particular, it should be possible for
participants to express a judgment such as “void” or “irrelevant”
without any suggestion, which the “neither” option satisfies. Note
that the first constraint above is exemplified with the conditional
which theoretically returns the value void in case its antecedent is
not known to be true, but the other connectives also have logical
cases of voidness for which the option “neither” is appropriate
for the same reasons. In brief, the aim of the third option is to
capture the judgment that neither the first option nor the second
is adequate, in the spirit of de Finetti, without influencing the
participants, while being applicable to the various connectives,
and the formulation adopted does just that.
In Experiment 1, each participant was asked to judge
the truth value of a negated sentence (e.g., the chip is
not square when the shape of the chip presented could
be square or round or indeterminate, and the color black,
white or indeterminate), hence nine presentations (or “trials”).
Participants were randomly allocated to one of the two
statements, the chip is not square and the chip is not black.
In Experiment 2, each participant received four sentences: first
the simple affirmation, The chip is a square to familiarize them
with the task. This was followed by a conjunction, The chip is
square and black; then there were two sentences presented in
a counter-balanced order: a disjunction disambiguated by “or
both” written in parentheses, The chip is square or black (or
both)6, and a conditional, If the chip is square, then it is black. The
conditional will not be detailed here (for the results, see Baratgin
et al., 2013).
In Experiment 3 (Japanese sample), each participant received
four sentences, in this order: the simple affirmation, The chip is
red, the conjunction, The chip is round and red, the conditional,
If the chip is round, then it is red, and the biconditional, If the chip
6In doing so, we followed psychologist’s traditional way of disambiguating “or” in
the study of reasoning.
is round, then it is red, and if it is red, then it is round. The original
sentences in French and Japanese can be found in Appendix C
(Supplementary Material).
Results
Method of Analysis
The tables produced by participants will be analyzed in two
stages. The first stage casts the results in terms of the traditional
two-valued classification. That is, we restrict the analysis of
the answers to the four “old” cells of the traditional table that
correspond to the four cases where the antecedent and the
consequent are either true or false. This allows the identification
of a 4-cell truth table for each connective and each participant
(and a 2-cell truth table in the case of negation). In this way, we
take up the classic 2 × 2 tables before extending them into new
3× 3 tables.
In the second stage of the analysis, we further characterize
the tables by considering all nine cells (and all three cells for
negation). Then the observed three-valued tables are compared
with the relevant three-valued formal tables of the nine systems.
The First Stage Analysis
Table 2 displays for each connective the frequency distribution
of the interpretations (the tables produced) in percent. To
answer the research question, we were basically interested in the
identification of the modal response, that is, we were looking
for a dominant interpretation belonging to the same system
across connectives. In each of the first three columns there is one
modal response >70% (close or equal to 100% in the first three
columns), that is, a clearly dominant response appears. However,
in the last two columns (conditional and biconditional) the
modal response is not so high. To identify this modal response
as a reliable dominant interpretation, a 95% confidence interval
for proportions (based on z values) was calculated (rounded to
the closest unit) for all percentages >10%. Confidence intervals
will also be given for the second stage analysis.
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TABLE 2 | First stage analysis.
Connective
Tables produced
Negation
E1
Conjunction
E2 and E3
Disjunction
E2
Conditional
E3
Biconditional
E3
Negation ¬A (or ¬C) 100 [94; 100]
Conjunction A∧C 98 [93; 100]
(Experiment 2)
98 [90; 100]
(Experiment 3)
22.4 [14; 35] 20.7 [12; 33]
Disjunction A v C 73.3 [64; 81]
Conditional “defective” C|′′d′′A 37.9 [27; 51] 1.7
Material conditional A ⊃ C 3.4
Material biconditional A⇔ C 15.5 [8; 27] 25.9 [16; 39]
Biconditional C||A 15.5 [8; 27] 50.0 [38; 63]
Other 2 (Experiment 2)
2 (Experiment 3)
26.7 [19; 36] 5.1 1.7
Frequency distribution of the tables produced (in percent) for the five connectives considering only two truth values for A and C. In brackets: 95% confidence intervals. E1, Experiment
1, N = 54; E2, Experiment 2, N = 101; E3, Experiment 3, N = 58.
For negation (experiment 1), all participants answered in
agreement with the two-valued truth table of negation.
For the conjunctive statement, 98% of the participants
in Experiment 2 as well as in Experiment 3 respected the
conjunction table.
For the disjunctive statement 73.3% respected the disjunction
table. These rates correspond to the traditional rate of response
presented in the literature. In particular, the review made by
Evans et al. (1993) for disjunction shows that the true-false
combinations are evaluated as false between 10 and 28% of the
time, indicating a conjunctive interpretation. Similarly, virtually
all of the 27 participants who did not respect the standard truth
table answered false to the true-false combinations, either on one
occasion (20) or on both (6). This means that these participants
had difficulty processing disjunction and had a tendency to
construe it as a conjunction in line with the classic results, and
that their error was not due to having trouble with the uncertain
cases or with the response format, that is, with the three-valued
system. Finally, there was no case of exclusive interpretation,
indicating that the disambiguation by “or both” was effective.
For the conditional statement, the two main tables produced
by Japanese participants of Experiment 3 correspond to the usual
“defective” conditional (37.9%) and conjunction tables (22.4%).
These frequencies are comparable to Baratgin et al. (2013) French
data. The only notable difference is that the frequency of the
biconditional table which was virtually null now reaches 15.5%.
For the biconditional statement, the dominant interpretation
is the 2 × 2 de Finetti table (50%), followed by the material
biconditional table (25.9%) and the conjunction table (20.7%).
The Second Stage Analysis
We consider all nine cells of the observed truth tables. Each
participant’s table is classified by considering the formal table to
which it is the closest. Our criterion of “closeness” or “distance” is
as follows. A participant’s table is taken to be a perfect instance of
a formal table X when it is identical to X. A participant’s table is a
“close” instance of X when it differs from X just by one cell, and
from any other formal table by more than one cell. If a participant’s
table differs equally (by one cell) from two (or more) formal
tables, it is still “close” to, but classified as ambiguous between,
these tables (these are equally likely). Finally, if a participant’s
table differs by two or more cells from all formal tables, then it is
classified as “indeterminate”: it differs toomuch tomake a reliable
identification.
First of all, for the simple affirmation, the chip is square, all
participants answered correctly, that is, certainly true when the
chip was square, certainly false when it was round, and neither
true nor false when its shape was blurred. This is evidence
that the square, blurred, and round shapes were visually well
distinguished, allowing participants to recognize the three logical
possibilities, and in particular, the representation of uncertainty
by the blurred image. Importantly, there was a perfect one-to-
one correspondence between the blurred image and the neither
answer, which validates this formulation.
For the negation, 48 participants (89%) fully conformed to
the involutive negation ¬i (in which the third value maps onto
itself) on all nine trials, and six participants (11%) answered
in agreement with this table on eight trials (meaning that
they were closer to the involutive negation than to any other
type of negation). Two of these six participants clearly made a
well-known slip triggered by double negation (Wason, 1959),
answering F instead of T to a round chip when the sentence
was The chip is not square. The other four participants negated
the ∅ chip by answering F (three cases) or the T chip by
answering ∅ (just for one case). The answers provided by these
four participants are thus closest to an involutive negation than
to left and right negations. In brief, we find evidence of only the
involutive negation.
Before considering conjunction and disjunction, note that
the numbers for these two connectives are smaller than they
are in the first stage. This is because the three-valued tables
for conjunction and disjunction (like for negation) are built as
expansions of the corresponding classic two-valued tables which
serve as filters, so that only participants who have produced
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the latter can be considered in the second stage. For instance,
we have mentioned earlier that 98% of the 101 participants in
Experiment 2 (i.e., 99 participants) produced a conjunction table
in the first stage analysis. Consequently, the second stage analysis
for conjunction and the related percentages are based on those
99 participants. The only case where N is notably diminished is
disjunction in Experiment 2 (from 101 to 74, as mentioned in
section The First Stage Analysis). The results for conjunction and
disjunction are detailed in Tables 3, 4 in which we will examine
the sum column.
For conjunction (Table 3), it is apparent that a large majority
of the observations coincide with theKLH connective∧K defined
in Appendix A, Table A.2 (Supplementary Material) (82.8% in
Experiment 2 and 96% in Experiment 3). The remaining
interpretations correspond to the McCarthy ∧M conjunction
(13.1 and 4%, respectively).
For disjunction (Table 4), the absolute majority of the
observations (58.1%) coincide with the KLH connective ∨K
defined in Appendix A, Table A.2 (Supplementary Material).
The remaining interpretations coincide with the Sobocinsky
disjunction ∨S (14.9%) and to tables that we call “ambiguous”
because they differ equally (by one cell) from both disjunctions
∨K and ∨S.
For the conditional (Table 5), almost all the participants’
interpretations coincide with a table that belongs to the Fi system.
We find notably that all of the 22 participants whose first stage
table was identified as de Finetti’s 2× 2 “defective” table expanded
this table into de Finetti’s conditional event (3× 3) table. In other
words, the conditional probability to produce the three-valued
conditional event table knowing that the two-valued table is the
“defective” table equals one. Also of interest is the fact that most
participants (84.6%) who have a conjunctive interpretation of the
conditional in the first stage expand this table into a conjunction
table (the KLH table) that is in the Fi system. These results
confirm the observations of Baratgin et al. (2013) with French
participants. Similarly, most participants giving a biconditional
interpretation produce the Fi biconditional. Interestingly, even
for the material biconditional interpretation, most participants
produce the associated Finettian table.
For the biconditional sentence (Table 5), the observations
are identical: almost all the participants’ interpretations
coincide with a table that belongs to the Fi system. In
particular, the dominant biconditional interpretation is
always the Finettian one, that is, 100% of 3 × 3 de
Finetti biconditional table. Similarly, most participants
(86.7%) with a material biconditional interpretation choose
the expanded Kleene material biconditional [defined in
Appendix A, Table A.5 (Supplementary Material)] and also
most of those (83.3%) with a conjunctive interpretation produce
the associated Finettian table [the KLH conjunction ∧K defined
in Appendix A, Table A2 (Supplementary Material)]. All this
suggests a remarkable consistency within a unique logical system,
namely the Fi system.
We can summarize these results as follows. The
overwhelmingly dominant table for A and C is the KLH
conjunction ∧K and the dominant table for A or C is the KLH
disjunction ∨K , both of which are features of the Finettian
system. Whatever the interpretation for if A then C (conditional,
conjunction, biconditional, material biconditional), it is the
corresponding Finettian table that is overwhelmingly the
dominant choice. This obtains also for if A then C and if C
then A, whatever its interpretation (conjunction, biconditional,
material biconditional). In addition, the involutive negation is
always observed.
DISCUSSION
De Finetti’s Level 1 System as the Best
Approximation
The hypothesis that de Finetti’s Level 1 system is adequate to
model the psychological three-valued truth tables for natural
language connectives is clearly supported by the results in
the following two respects. One, its constitutive connectives:
involutive negation ¬i, the KLH conjunction ∧K , the KLH
disjunction ∨K , the Fi conditional C|FiA and the Fi biconditional
C||FiA, have been found to be the dominant interpretations.
TABLE 4 | Second stage analysis. Disjunction.
Disjunction tables produced (0)* (1)** Sum (0)+(1)
KLH (C∨KA) 52.7 5.4 58.1 [48; 69]
Sobocinsky (C∨SA) 8.1 6.8 14.9 [9; 25]
Ambiguous (1 difference with ∨K and with ∨S) 16.2 16.2 [12; 29]
Other 10.8 [8; 22]
Frequency of tables produced (in percent) considering three truth values. Experiment 2,
N = 74. *(0), 0 difference (all nine cells coincide); **(1), one difference (8 cells coincide). In
brackets: 95% confidence intervals.
TABLE 3 | Second stage analysis. Conjunction.
Conjunction tables produced (0)* (1)** Sum (0)+(1)
E2 E3 E2 E3 E2 E3
KLH (C∧KA) 76.7 96 6.1 0 82.8 [74; 89] 96 [88; 99]
McCarthy (C∧MA) 13.1 4 0 0 13.1 [8; 21] 4
Other 4.1 4.1 0
Frequency of tables produced (in percent) considering three truth values. *(0), 0 difference (all nine cells coincide); **(1), one difference (8 cells coincide). In brackets: 95% confidence
intervals. E2, Experiment 2, N = 99; E3, Experiment 3, N = 57. The Table reads as follows: in Experiment 2, 76.7% of the 99 participants produced the exact KLH table, and 6.1%
produced it with one difference, so that 82.8% produced the KLH table with at most one difference, with a 95% confidence interval of [74; 89], etc.
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TABLE 5 | Second stage analysis. Conditional and biconditional.
Conditional Biconditional
Tables produced (0)* (1)** Sum (0)+(1) (0) (1) Sum (0)+(1)
Conditional N = 22 (37.9%) N = 1 (1.7%)
de Finetti (C|FiA) 95.5 4.5 100 [85; 100] 100 100
Conjunction N = 13 (22.4%) N = 12 (20.7%)
KLH (A ∧K C) 53.8 30.8 84.6 [58; 96] 75 8.3 83.3 [55; 95]
Other 15.4 15.4 [4; 42] 16.7 16.7 [5; 45]
Material conditional N = 2 (3.5%)
Kleene (A ⊃K C) 50 50
Other 50 50
Material biconditional N = 9 (15.5%) N = 15 (25.9%)
Kleene (A⇔K C) 77.8 11.1 88.9 [56; 98] 66.7 20 86.7 [62; 96]
Other 11.1 [2; 44] 13.3 13.3 [4; 38]
Biconditional N = 9 (15.5%) N = 29 (50%)
de Finetti (C||FiA) 77.8 77.8 [45; 94] 93.1 6.9 100 [88; 100]
Other 22.2 [6, 55]
Other N = 3 (5.2%) N = 1 (1.7%)
Frequency of tables produced (in percent) considering three truth values. Experiment 3, N = 58. *(0), 0 difference (all nine cells coincide); **(1), one difference (8 cells coincide). In
brackets: 95% confidence intervals. The Table reads as follows: for the conditional, 22 participants (out of 58 = 37.9%) produced a conditional table that was identical to de Finetti’s
table and no other conditional table was observed; still for the conditional, 13 participants (out of 58 = 22.4%) produced a conjunction table; 11 of these (84.6%) produced a KLH table;
and 2 (15.4%) produced a different conjunction table, etc.
This was the case for the two languages studied, French and
Japanese, which offers a remarkable cross-linguistic support to
the Finettian theory on Level 1, given the remoteness of the
two linguistic families. Two, even when the conditional and
biconditional sentences are not construed as a conditional or
a biconditional, respectively, the truth table that is produced
still belongs most generally to the Fi system. However, it can
be objected to the first point that the other two logical systems
that are built on the same connectives, namely McDermott, and
Reichenbach could, eo ipso, be regarded as possible candidates. Is
there a way to decide between the three systems? We have seen
earlier that the latter two differ from de Finetti in that they have
additional connectives.
Consider first Reichenbach’s system, (2) in Appendix B
(Supplementary Material). It has additional connectives (two
more negations), and two material conditionals and two
material biconditionals [see Tables A.1 and A.4 (Supplementary
Material)]. We made no observation of a form of negation
other than the involutive one, nor did we find any trace of
the two forms of material conditional or biconditional. We can
conclude that Reichenbach’s three-valued logic is inadequate in
that it predicts several truth tables, that is, interpretations of the
negation, conditional, and biconditional, that our participants
never had. This is not too surprising given that the objective
of his logic is to account for a problem that belongs to the
epistemology of quantum mechanics. Even though there is
striking overlap between his system and the three-valued table
of the Finettian conditional, the additional connectives needed
for his purpose are irrelevant for psychological modeling. To
take but one example of the lack of plausibility of the system
from a psycholinguistic point of view, the cyclical negation of
A requires a triple application of the operator to get back to A:
A =∼∼∼ A; and the complete negation holds only as: A = A,
whereas double negation does apply to diametrical (involutive)
negation: A = ¬i¬iA (see Table A.1).
McDermott’s system, (4) in Appendix B (Supplementary
Material), also has additional connectives: one conjunction (∧S)
and one disjunction (∨S). For disjunction, we did find some
trace of ∨S (15%, against 58% for ∨K), but for conjunction we
did not find any trace of ∧S. This does not support the system.
However, before eliminating it, we must envisage that there
may be special conditions or circumstances under which the
second set of connectives is used, which our material may have
failed to meet. McDermott (1996) contented himself to remark,
based on intuition, that and, and or are ambiguous in natural
language, hence his definition of two different connectives in
each case. But to exemplify the ambiguity he did not use simple
sentences made of two atomic components, such as A and B,
or A or B. Instead, he used complex sentences, one component
of which was always a conditional (such as A and if B then
C, or A or if B then C). Obviously, if this is required for the
supplementary connectives to apply, the double connective claim
cannot be refuted by our experimental results, which are based
on at most two atomic sentences. McDermott’s theory is not
specified enough in its current state and the question remains
open for further research. But it should be noted that if the
claim becomes experimentally supported, it would come as an
extension of the Finettian system proper. It is remarkable that
McDermott’s approach has much in common with de Finetti’s,
in particular in the assessment of truth values using the betting
method, and crucially in the definition of the natural conditional.
Finally, the conditions that trigger the additional connectives
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interpretation could have a pragmatic explanation, keeping the
Finettian system semantically unaltered. For all these reasons,
the objections to the first point above seem hard to maintain; in
addition they leave the second point unaffected. This is why we
can confidently conclude that our results designate the Finettian
system as the best approximation to the participants’ three-valued
truth tables obtained from judgments of truth and falsity of
atomic sentences describing uncertain characteristics.
The Significance of the Results: Logic and
the Study of Human Reasoning
Our results constitute a step toward giving an integrated answer
to three related questions. One, is there a dominant interpretation
of the basic connectives with sentences that have a truth-value
gap? Two, do these interpretations constitute a consistent system?
Three, is there a way to solve the half-a-century-old problem of
the “defective” truth table of the conditional?
The Existence of a Dominant Interpretation
We have obtained an affirmative answer to the first question. For
each connective (negation, conjunction, disjunction, conditional,
and biconditional), participants’ interpretations were distributed
over a limited number of table varieties among numerous
possible tables, and for each connective, there was a clear
dominant interpretation, namely, involutive negation, the KLH
conjunction ∧K , the KLH disjunction ∨K , the Fi conditional
C|FiA and the Fi biconditional C||FiA, respectively. For negation
there was a single interpretation (involutive). For conjunction
the modal interpretation (∧K), collapsed over two experiments,
was close to 90%. For disjunction the modal interpretation (∨K)
was chosen 58% of the time (among participants who had a
2 × 2 disjunctive interpretation) while the next most frequent
interpretation was seldom chosen (16%). For the conditional
and the biconditional, one interpretation (C|FiA and C||FiA,
respectively) was chosen 100% of the time (among participants
who had the corresponding 2 × 2 interpretation). In brief, given
people’s two-valued interpretation, there is always one way to
extend this interpretation to a three-valued table that musters
an absolute majority, and (except for disjunction) there is near
unanimity for this interpretation.
The Existence of a System
We have obtained an affirmative answer to the second question
too: not only is there a predominant interpretation for each
connective, but this interpretation always belongs to the same
system. It could have been the case that while the dominant table
for one connective belongs to one system, the dominant table
for another connective belongs to another system. But this is not
what we have observed: for each connective, out of all the possible
tables, it is the one that belongs to the Finettian system that
dominates. And there is more: even when the two-valued table
has deviating interpretations, which occurs for the conditional
and the biconditional, the table is almost always completed
into the corresponding Finettian table. See for instance how
in Experiment 3 the two-valued conjunctive interpretation of
the biconditional made by 12 participants (20.7%, Table 2, first
stage analysis) leads ten of them (83.3%) to the corresponding
conjunctive Finettian (∧K) three-valued interpretation shown in
Table 5 (second stage analysis). All this means that the present
results are more than an extension to the other connectives
of the results obtained for the conditional by Baratgin et al.
(2013). Rather, what we have established here is the existence,
in people’s judgments under uncertainty, of mutually consistent
interpretations of the standard connectives organized in one
system, namely de Finetti’s Level 1 system.
Interpreting the “Defective” Table
Finally, we have obtained confirmation of a positive answer to the
third question, “Can the puzzle of the defective table be solved?”
Three-valued truth tables generalize two-valued tables. They
collapse into two-valued tables when the component sentences
are certain. In such a case, for the conditional, the third value
∅ left in the body of the 2 × 2 table constitutes the “defective”
table and the explanation of its origin. Note that there is no
conflict between the two-valued and three-valued tables. The
latter incorporate the former in the same way that rational
numbers include integers.
The Significance of the Results:
Interpreting the Third Value
We recalled some important findings in the introduction. For
several decades psychologists have known that people judge
that if A then C is true when A holds and C holds, false
when A holds and C does not, and neither true nor false
when A does not hold. For the last decade, there has been
growing psychological evidence that people tend to judge that
the probability of the indicative conditional, P(if A then C),
is the conditional probability of C given A, P(C|A). There
is also evidence supporting the claim that people tend to be
coherent in explicit deduction under uncertainty. More recently,
psychologists have shown that there is a close relation between
indicative conditionals and conditional bets (Oberauer and
Wilhelm, 2003; Politzer et al., 2010; Baratgin et al., 2013, 2014;
Nakamura et al., 2018). There is an urgent need to integrate
these experimental findings. The integration has been held back
because psychologists did not raise the general question of
which three-valued tables correspond most closely to people’s
judgments under uncertainty.
In the present paper, we have raised the question and proposed
an answer based on de Finetti’s Level 1 system, offering a model
of the interpretation of natural language connectives under
uncertainty. Obviously, we should keep in mind the limitations
of our study due to the size of the samples and more importantly
to the fact that the sentences in the experiments referred to
specific materials. No overall investigation of the foundations
of de Finetti’s system, at Level 1, had yet been carried out.
In view of the psychological relevance and plausibility of de
Finetti’s subjective approach to probability, and of the successful
application of his concepts and ideas recalled above, it would
have been deeply puzzling if the interpretation of connectives
had been found to be at variance with his system. But on
the contrary, our results showing that people conform to de
Finetti’s Level 1 system add much support to the project of
developing the psychology of reasoning on a de Finettian basis,
within the Bayesian account of ordinary reasoning that we
are pursuing.
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Our results should lead to more research. Important questions
concerning the interpretation of the third value still await
investigation. We have seen that the various systems of three-
valued logic have different uses and objectives in defining a third
value (even though most systems studied interpret it as a truth-
value gap, see Appendix B (Supplementary Material). However,
there appears to be an underlying common notion, that of doubt
about truth and falsity due to uncertainty.
Even though we have identified the most frequent
interpretation of each connective, namely the one that belongs
to the Finettian system, it must be kept in mind that this result
relies on a few experiments that operationalized uncertainty as
ignorance about which of two values a visually defined variable
had. Visual uncertainty about the identification of two shapes or
two colors was hypothesized to coincide with de Finetti’s concept
of a “void” judgment. We certainly acknowledge that there is
a need for additional experiments using other languages and,
more importantly, that vary the source of uncertainty. There
are perhaps other types of visual uncertainty, e.g., arising from
soritical series (see Douven et al., 2018), and we should move
beyond the visual modality, e.g., to sound or haptic modalities,
and then beyond the sensory modalities, e.g., to logical or
semantic uncertainty (as can be found in the paradoxes of
self-reference; see Elqayam, 2006). The choices are unlimited,
for uncertainty is everywhere in natural language, a point de
Finetti himself would have emphasized. If the results of such
experiments are consistent with the present observations, then
there will be stronger support for the general conclusion that
the Fi system is the best semantic theory of the interpretation of
natural language connectives under uncertainty.
In contrast, it is possible to operationalize a much more
common concept of uncertainty. Considering that ignorance
reflects a lack of information that could be dispelled as
information increases, still using the same material participants
could be provided with frequency distributions about the
proportions of round, square, black, and white chips, that is,
manipulating the base rates. With this additional knowledge, one
is invited to move from radical uncertainty to a gradable notion
of uncertainty in which the individuals’ degrees of belief vary
between 0 and 1. In this modified situation there is no more total
ignorance and the individual shifts from Level 1 to Level 2. But in
doing so, one would be losing the state of total ignorance whose
investigation is the objective of the present work, and as noted
earlier (section The de Finettian Approach) the psychological
research on reasoning under uncertainty (and indeed a large
amount of research on judgment and decision making under
uncertainty) has essentially been carried out on Level 2.
We have considered the basic connectives, but it might be
interesting for future research to study more complex sentences
than the basic ones. Conditionals can be embedded like in left
embedding If they were outside (O), then if it rained (R) they got
wet (W) or in right embedding If the cup broke (B) if dropped
(D), then it was fragile (F) (see Gibbard, 1981; Douven and
Verbrugge, 2013; Douven, 2016). In the Finettian framework
of Level 1, these sentences can be written as (W|FiR)|FiO and
F|Fi(B|FiD), respectively and they collapse into a single form,
W|Fi(R ∧K O) and F|Fi(B ∧K D), respectively (de Finetti, 1974,
p. 328). Their truth tables can be established, allowing a further
test of the theory on its Level 1 (van Wijnbergen-Huitink
et al., 2015). Recently the Finettian treatment of embedded
conditionals on level 2 has attracted the attention of theorists
(Gilio and Sanfilippo, 2014; Douven, 2017; Sanfilippo et al., 2018)
with results that reflect the difference of perspective between the
two levels.
One final remark also for future research: in the current study
we have compared various systems by eliciting judgments of
truth value for connected sentences. Given that each system has
a consequence relation, another way to test the systems against
each other could be to study the elementary inferences that
reasoners are willing to make.
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